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breach with appropriate legislation. Until this dispute is resolved,
there will remain the possibility of unjust results where "[state
laws] which are designed to protect innocent persons dealing in faith
on the revelations of title records are twisted to permit the great
national sovereign to take property from one who is the acknowl-
edged owner of it to apply on the tax debts of another . . who has
transferred the property.""
John M. McMullen
Reciprocal Dealing in Conglomerate Mergers
I. TYPES OF MERGERS
For purposes of antitrust law there are three basic types of mergers:
(1) vertical, (2) horizontal, and (3) conglomerate. Generally, mer-
gers are effected by acquisition of either stock or assets. An economic
arrangement between companies in a supplier-customer relationship is
termed vertical A vertical merger refers to an expansion directed
toward control of raw material suppliers or toward acquisition of
product outlets. Its primary vice results from tying a customer to a
supplier, thus foreclosing competitors of either party from a pre-
viously open market segment.!
A horizontal merger is aimed at absorption of a company in the
same general product line.' These combinations offer the greatest prob-
ability of anti-competitive effects. By combining business powers
operating in the same or nearly indistinguishable product areas, hori-
zontal mergers limit competition almost by definition and should be
subject to much closer scrutiny than should either the vertical or the
conglomerate.'
A conglomerate merger is a hybrid, a unique combination often
retaining some features of either horizontal or vertical arrangements.
Because of this wide range of possible relationships, no exact definition
of a conglomerate merger can be given. In a general sense, conglom-
erate mergers can best be defined as all mergers neither horizontal nor
30 349 F.2d at 629 (Brown, J., dissenting).
1Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962); Note, 17 Sw. L.J. 286
(1963).2 1d. at 323-25.
3 Id. at 334.
' Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REv.
1313, 1322 (1965).
[Vol. 20
vertical.' The conglomerate usually relates to the entry of a large,
diversified firm into a new product line. The theory is that in the
conglomerate each product line is but a single segment of a diversi-
fied corporate structure, and thus short-term losses can be incurred
with impunity by balancing them against profits from alternate, well-
established lines. The mere substitution of a large concern as the
owner of a competing enterprise may lessen market vitality because
of the large firm's retaliatory power. Fear of an extended price war
may keep smaller firms in line with desired pricing policies, marketing
techniques, or geographic market divisions. Also, a conglomerate
company is often able to effect substantial increases in sales of either
its products or the acquired firm's products through reciprocal deal-
ing.' Companies desiring to sell their products to the conglomerate
structure may be forced to reciprocate in purchasing their require-
ments of other merchandise from it. A diversified product structure
in a conglomerate firm lends itself to such reciprocal purchasing by
and from other companies in related fields.
II. SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT'
The original section 7 of the Clayton Act' was directed only at
combinations accomplished through stock acquisition.' Any merger
effected by a purchase of assets was beyond its scope." In addition,
officials charged with enforcing the Clayton Act" refused to direct
its sanctions toward any mergers except those between directly com-
'Id. at 1315. The two types of conglomerate mergers are: The "pure" conglomerate in
which there is no discernible economic relationship between the acquiring and acquired firm
and the "mixed" conglomerate (the type at which anti-trust actions are directed) which
may involve horizontal or vertical relationships or both. Id. at 1315-16.
OId. at 1322-23.
738 Star. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 14-26 (1958).
'The original § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), read in relevant part as follows:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another engaged
also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially
lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the
corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any
section or community, or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
' See International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 298 (1930); Vivaudou Inc. v. FTC,
54 F.2d 273, 276 (2d Cir. 1931); Temple Anthracite Coal Co. v. FTC, 51 F.2d 656, 659-61
(3d Cir. 1931). Contra, United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586,
592 (1957); Note, 12 Sw. L.J. 128 (1958).
"Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587, 595 (1934); FTC v. West-
ern Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554, 559-60 (1926); United States v. Celanese Corp. of America,
91 F. Supp. 14, 17 (1950); Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and
Economics, 74 HARv. L. REv. 226, 229-30; Turner, supra note 4, at 1313-14.
"' The Justice Department and The Federal Trade Commission are both charged with
enforcing the federal anti-trust laws. See S. Rep. No. 1175, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950).
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peting companies." Thus, vertical integration was thought to be
beyond the scope of section 7 as originally enacted."
In 1950 Congress amended section 7 to include asset-acquisition
mergers.' The section now reads in relevant part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or in-
directly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and
no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Com-
mission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another cor-
poration engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in
any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."
Not only did Congress expand the scope of the act to include asset
mergers, but also it apparently intended to proscribe vertical com-
binations which tended to create a monopoly or to lessen competi-
tion.' Congress evidently wished to fashion an antitrust weapon
which could be aimed at all mergers tending toward a substantial
lessening of competition.' Thus, the fusion of relatively unrelated
businesses, the conglomerate merger, was brought within the effective
range of the amended section."
In actions under section 7, the courts have recognized that the pro-
vision is primarily, though not absolutely, concerned with the prob-
ability rather than the certainty that competition will be retarded.
This primary concern makes possible the arrest of any combination
in restraint of trade in its incipiency. But the emphasis on probabil-
"See cases and authorities cited note 10 supra.
13 In 1957, however, the Supreme Court in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957), Note, 12 Sw. L.J. 128 (1958), held the original section to apply
to vertical integrations. Further expanding the original provisions, the Court held that com-
panies did not have to compete directly to be subject to the sanctions of § 7. According to
the decision, the merger was within the scope of § 7 if the effect of the merger was to
restrain commerce or to create a monopoly. Congressional amendment in 1950, 64 Stat. 1125,
eliminated the requirement that "competition between the corporation whose stock is . . .
acquired and the corporation making the acquisition" must be lessened.
64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
'4 "The purpose of the proposed legislation is to prevent corporations from acquiring an-
other corporation by means of the acquisition of its assets, whereunder [sic] the present law
it is prohibited from acquiring the stock of said corporation." S. Rep. No. 1175, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1950).
"564 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
" H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1949).
1764 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914); See S.
Rep. No. 1175, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950).
""That § 7 was intended to apply to all mergers-horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate
-was specifically reiterated by the House Report on the final bill. H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 11." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 n.31 (1962), Note, 17
Sw. L.J. 286 (1963).
9 Id. at 323.
"See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). A merger
was invalidated under § 7 because it would have resulted in ose bank's controlling at least
30% of the commercial bank business in the four-county Philadelphia area.
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ity does not preclude an action under section 7 after such restraint
has become a reality.2 The justification for action after a merger has
become a fait accompli is usually couched in terms referring to a
threat which only recently has become apparent." Preoccupation with
"probabilities" does not open the door to prohibitions based upon
mere "possibility" that restraint of trade would actually take place.23
"Reasonable probability" is the criterion most often employed by the
courts.-
In applying the section to specific cases, the areas of effective com-
21 See, e.g., United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957),
Note, 12 Sw. L.J. 128 (1958).
To accomplish the congressional aim, the Government may proceed at any time
that an acquisition may be said with reasonable probability to contain a threat
that it may lead to a restraint of commerce or tend to create a monopoly of a
line of commerce. Even when the purchase is solely for investment, the plain
language of § 7 contemplates an action at any time the stock is used to bring
about .. . the substantial lessening of competition.
Id. at 597-98.
2""Prior cases under § 7 were brought at or near the time of acquisition. None of these
cases holds, or even suggests, that the Government is foreclosed from bringing the action at
any time when a threat of the prohibited effects is evident." Id. at 598.
2 But cf. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964), on remand 246
F. Supp. 917 (1965). Pennsalt Chemical Company and Olin Mathieson Chemical Company
formed a joint venture to form a third corporation, Penn-Olin Chemical Company. The
purpose of this new entity was to manufacture and sell sodium chlorate in the southeastern
part of the United States. The United States District Court for the district of Delaware
originally dismissed the government's complaint, and an appeal was taken by the government
to the Supreme Court. A divided Court remanded the case for a determination of whether
potential competition had been eliminated by the joint venture. Mr. Justice Clark, speaking
for the majority, said:
Certainly the sole test would not be the probability that both companies would
have entered the market. Nor would the consideration be limited to the proba-
bility that one entered alone. There still remained for consideration the fact
that Penn-Olin eliminated the potential competition of the corporation that
might have remained at the edge of the market, continually threatening to
enter. Just as a merger eliminates actual competition, this joint venture may
well foreclose any prospect of competition between Olin and Pennsalt in the
relevant sodium chlorate market.
378 U.S. at 173.
Even though the court speaks in terms of "probability," such a contingent lessening of po-
tential competition approaches the realm of "possibility." The district court on remand
again dismissed the government's action on the ground that the burden of proof had not
been met. The court stated that the government would have to show a reasonable proba-
bility, absent the joint venture, that one of the corporations would have constructed a
sodium chlorate plant in the same general location. A showing of reasonable probability
was not made, and the court refused to invalidate the formation of the joint venture cor-
poration on the grounds of mere possibility. "It is, of course, possible that if there had been
no joint venture Pennsalt alone would have constructed a facility in the Southwest for the
manufacture of chlorate. . . .Anything is possible. But, if the record is to be the criterion,
it is unlikely that this would have occurred." 246 F. Supp. at 934.
24 The final Senate Report contained explicit language relating to this question:
The use of these words ['may be'] means that the bill, if enacted, would
not apply to the mere possibility but only to the reasonable probability of the
prescribed [sic] effect. . . .The words 'may be' have been in section 7 of the
Clayton Act since 1914. The concept of reasonable probability conveyed by
these words is a necessary element in any statute which seeks to arrest restraints
of trade in their incipiency. ...
S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1950).
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petition (frequently termed the relevant market) is determined by
reference to product and geographic markets (lines of commerce and
sections of the country)." In construing lines of commerce in hori-
zontal or vertical mergers, courts are assisted by the nature of these
combinations."8 Product relationships are relatively easy to trace
between companies producing the same type goods (horizontal com-
binations) and between companies in a supplier-customer relationship
(vertical mergers). In a conglomerate merger situation the task of
defining areas of effective competition and tracing probable effects of
a merger are more complex."7
III. FTC v. CONSOLIDATED FOODS CORP.
2 8
Consolidated Foods Corp., a company owning food processing
plants and networks of wholesale and retail food outlets, acquired
Gentry, Inc., a manufacturer of dehydrated onion and garlic. FTC
v. Consolidated Foods Corp.'s represents the effort of the Federal
Trade Commission to have the merger invalidated on the ground that
a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act "° resulted from the com-
bination. The Commission contended that both potential and actual
lessening of competition resulted from the merger. This allegation was
supported primarily by Consolidated's potential to institute reciprocal
dealing arrangements with other companies."
Consolidated purchased in substantial amounts the products of
other food processors in connection with its wholesale and retail sell-
ing endeavors. These food processing companies (Consolidated's sup-
pliers), in turn, purchased dehydrated onion and garlic (Gentry's
two main products) for use in their operations. A reciprocal buying
arrangement based upon mutual opportunity for supply purchase
would prohibit competitors of Consolidated and the firms purchasing
from it from entering the supply markets. A possibility, at least, of
'See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), Note, 17 Sw. L.J. 286 (1963); United States
v. E. T. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957), Note, 12 Sw. L.J. 128 (1958).
"See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); United
States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957), Note, 12 Sw. L.J. 128
(1958). The Philadelphia Nat'l Bank merger's probable effect of concentrating a large pro-
portion of the commercial banking business in one institution was readily apparent. See text
accompanying note 20 supra. The du Pont-General Motors standing as supplier-customer led
to a foreclosure of outside companies which also was easily traced.
"T Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REv.
1313, 1315 (1965). "The rules developed for determining the validity of horizontal and
vertical mergers clearly will not do for conglomerate acquisitions generally." Id. at 1315.
28380 U.S. 592 (1965).
2s Ibid.
a°64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
"l Consolidated Foods Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (1961-1963 Transfer Binder) 5 16182.
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reciprocity was thus presented in the facts of the case. Food proces-
sors selling to Consolidated might find advantage in giving preference
to Gentry products for reciprocity purposes. 2 Imperfect competitive
conditions in Gentry's market, moreover, increased the probability of
reciprocal dealing. Gentry and its main competitor, Basic Vegetable
Products, Inc., accounted for approximately ninety per-cent of the
dehydrated onion and garlic market both before and after the acqui-
sition. Prior to the merger in 1951, Gentry's share of total sales was
thirty-two percent; in 1958 its portion was thirty-five per-cent of a
doubled industry output. Despite Gentry's absolute increase in sales
over the seven year period, the firm's product revenue allocation was
subject to a marked realignment. Though its portion of the dehydrated
onion market increased seven per-cent, Gentry's share of dehydrated
garlic sales actually dropped twelve per-cent during the same period.
Whatever advantage the merger may have given Gentry, it appar-
ently did not prevent a significant decline in its share of the garlic
market.
When faced with the Commission's ruling, the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit reversed the decision, holding that probabil-
ity of a substantial lessening of competition was not shown." The
court considered the oligopolistic nature of the industry and gave
heavy weight to post-acquisition evidence. Relying particularly upon
the drop in dehydrated garlic sales and the failure of Gentry sub-
stantially to increase sales of onion, the court held that neither actual
nor potential restraint was present."4
The Supreme Court sustained the conclusion of the Commission,
placing emphasis upon the probability of reciprocal buying between
the two companies and the resultant discouraging effect upon entry
into the market by new firms.as
3 380 U.S. at 596-97. Officials of Consolidated made overt attempts to encourage re-
ciprocity and to assist Gentry in its selling. A letter sent to Consolidated's distributing divi-
sions shows at least an attempt to find product areas in which reciprocity could be brought
to bear:
Oftentimes, it is a great advantage to know when you are calling on a
prospect, whether or not that prospect is a supplier of someone within your
own organization. Everyone believes in reciprocity providing all things are
equal.
Attached is a list of prospects for our Gentry products. We would like to
have you indicate on the list whether or not you are purchasing any of your
supplies from them. If so, indicate whether your purchases are relatively large,
small, or insignificant. ...
.... If you have any special suggestions, as to how you could be helpful
in properly presenting Gentry to any of those listed, it will be appreciated.
Id. at 596. (Emphasis added.)
" Consolidated Foods Corp. v. FTC, 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1964).
34 Ibid.
3' 380 U.S. at 600-01.
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Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for seven members of the Court,
held "at the outset that the 'reciprocity' made possible by such an
acquisition is one of the congeries of anticompetitive practices at
which the antitrust laws are aimed. The practice results in 'an irrele-
vant and alien factor' . . . intruding into the choice among compet-
ing products, creating at the least 'a priority' on the business at equal
prices." Pointing out that "section 7 of the Clayton Act is concerned
with 'probabilities, not certainties . . .' " the Court concluded that
"reciprocity in trading as a result of an acquisition violates §7, if the
probability of a lessening of competition is shown.""7 The Court
found that the possibility of reciprocal dealing became a probability
in light of the degree of competition present in the dehydrated onion
and garlic industry.
Though not condemning absolutely the Court of Appeals' use of
post-acquisition evidence, the majority in Consolidated Foods con-
cluded that "it gave too much weight to it."" s Emphasizing again the
probability test of section 7, the Court stated that "if the post-acqui-
sition evidence were given conclusive weight or was allowed to over-
ride all probabilities, then acquisitions would go forward willy-nilly,
the parties biding their time until reciprocity was allowed fully to
bloom." In addition to finding that a probability of restraint was
present, the majority found that the post-acquisition evidence tended
to confirm the anti-competitive aspects of the merger. ° Gentry's
increase in onion sales and loss of only twelve per-cent of its garlic
business sustained the probability of reciprocity, for these shifts took
place at a time when its main competitor had a product quality
advantage."1
The court found probable and actual reciprocity coming about as
a direct result of the merger. This reciprocity, in turn, strengthened
the already-present oligopolistic characteristics of the industry, thus
leading to a section 7 violation of the Clayton Act." Mr. Justice
Stewart concurred in the result reached by the court but differed
with the majority as to the proper weight to be given post-acquisition
3 Id. at 594.
'lid. at 595.
1s Id. at 598.
31 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Id. at 599-600.
42 See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Reynolds Metals
Co., 56 F.T.C. 743 (1960), aff'd, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank case invalidated an oligopoly-strengthening horizontal merger. See text accompanying
note 20 supra. The Reynolds merger, though also strengthening oligopoly, would have sur-
vived as a vertical acquisition but was struck down as a conglomerate.
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evidence.' His separate opinion emphasizes that the Commission
should rely upon the best information available in determining prob-
ability of restraint, "whether it is an examination of the market
structure before the merger has taken place, or ... after the merger
has been consummated." Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring separately,
stated agreement with the views as expressed by Stewart except as to
post-acquisition evidence. 5 His opinion indicates that only evidence
upon which the Federal Trade Commission has acted should be con-
sidered by the Court."6
IV. CONCLUSION
However correct the Consolidated Foods decision may be on its
particular facts, it does little in the way of setting firm guidelines for
merger activity. In prior cases, the Court has recognized the need to
protect competition rather than to insulate competitors." Neverthe-
less, underlying the philosophy and application of the antitrust laws
is a concern for the small business firm. When the court applied
section 7 in the 1962 Brown Shoe"' decision, the majority felt that it
"[could not] fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competi-
tion through the protection of small, locally owned businesses.
4 9
The Federal Trade Commission has been even more active in imple-
menting this Congressional concern." No matter how wise or unwise
this policy may be and irrespective of the fact that economic diffusion
may have been the motivating factor behind Congressional action,"
43380 U.S. at 602-08.
44 Id. at 606.
45380 U.S. at 601-02.
46Id. at 601.
*7See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962), Note, 17 Sw.
L.J. 286 (1963).
41 Ibid.
41 Ibid. At times the courts seem carried away by the romance of anti-trust endeavors;
often they paint an ominous picture calling to mind an impending upheaval or class struggle.
The following language is taken from United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166
U.S. 290, 323 (1941):
Trade or commerce under those circumstances may nevertheless be badly and
unfortunately restrained by driving out of business the small dealers and
worthy men whose lives have been spent therein, and who might be unable
to readjust themselves to their altered surroundings. Mere reduction in the
price of the commodity dealt in might be dearly paid for by the 'ruin of such
a class, and the absorption of control over one commodity by an all-powerful
combination of capital.
Ibid. (Emphasis added), (opinion by Mr. Justice Black).
'0 See, e.g., Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944 (1962). "[N]ecessary proof of violation
of the statute consists of types of evidence showing that the acquiring firm possesses sig-
nificant power in some markets or that its overall organization gives it a decisive advantage
in efficiency over its smaller rivals." Id. at 1084. (Emphasis added.)
" "Throughout the history of these statutes it has been constantly assumed that one of
their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost,
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small businesses should not be protected at all costs within existing
monopolistic"2 or oligopolistic55 markets. Given an imperfectly com-
petitive market, assailing mergers with the purpose of protecting and
maintaining competition may actually result in a lessening of compe-
tition within the market." In a highly developed market, moreover,
a decrease in price competition may be more than offset by an increase
in more effective non-price competition.5 In the Consolidated Foods
situation, for example, competition and product innovation might
have been increased by strengthening Gentry at the expense of Basic
Vegetable Products, Inc. "Indeed, the evidence seems to show that,
after the acquisition, the industry reflected the salutary qualities
normally associated with free competition. Overall, both Basic and
Gentry were furnishing a better product at the end of this period
than at the beginning.""s Gentry's industry competition did not pre-
sent a small, relatively weak firm to be protected; yet the Court is
an organization of industry in small units which can effectively compete with each other."
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945) (Judge
Learned Hand).
52 There are many sellers of a particular kind of product in a market situation
characterized by monopolistic competition, and the product of each seller is
in some way differentiated from the product of every other seller ...
When the number of sellers is large enough so that the actions of any one
have no perceptible effect upon the other sellers and their actions have no
perceptible effect upon him, the industry becomes one of monopolistic com-
petition.
Leftwich, The Price System and Resource Allocation 268 (Rev. ed. 1961). See generally id.
at 268-78.
as [Oligopolistic competition is found in] market situations in which there are
few enough sellers of a particular product for the activities of one to be of
importance to the others. . . .A single seller occupies a position of sufficient
importance in the product market for changes in his market activities to
have repercussions on the others. Other sellers react to the market activities
of the one and their reactions in turn have repercussions on him.
Id. at 233. See generally id. at 233-67.
" Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARv. L. REV. 27, 47 (1949):
Horizontal and vertical integration will often serve to limit monopoly or
destroy it. For example, vertical integration may be the response to a supplier's
monopoly: by making instead of buying, one by-passes the toll gate. A similar
tactic may end a buying monopoly. Diversification may serve a similar pur-
pose: if there are monopoly profits being earned in a product which a firm
can easily add to its line, it will probably enter the field in order to share
them. The possibility that integration or diversification may be the response
of one's business neighbors is one of the most potent of all forces maintaining
competition in our econo-my.
Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
sa As a sector of the economy becomes more highly developed and as imperfect com-
petition sets in, price competition often gives way to non-price competition. This trend is
aided by the significant role advertising and brand identification play in the present-day
economy. In some cases, however, actual innovations may take place; and some of the un-
desirable effects of imperfect competition can be offset. "Hence, a decision whether the
vigor of competition as a whole has been significantly reduced depends on a weighing process
in which the result is determined by our value judgments as to which forms of rivalry are
most beneficial." Bok, supra note 10, at 244. See generally id. at 238-49.
" FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 605 (1965) (Stewart, J., concurring).
forced to apply measures designed for the protection of such busi-
nesses to all merger cases coming before it. If the purpose of section 7
is to encourage a higher degree of competition, the Court might well
consider separate sets of criteria when dealing with market models as
they approach or diverge from idealized competitive standards."' In
fact, when surveying imperfectly competitive industries and when
viewing unpredictable conglomerate mergers, the Court perhaps
should give strong weight to available post-acquisition evidence."
The Court of Appeals concluded that "probability can best be
gauged by what the past has taught."' " The majority of the Supreme
Court countered this view by stating that "no group acquiring a com-
pany with reciprocal buying opportunities is entitled to a 'free trial'
period.""0 Though the Court's reasoning is based upon section 7 terms
of probabilities, its effect may be to give the Government a "free
trial period" separate and distinct entirely from any consideration of
probabilities.
The merger in this case was achieved in 1951, yet the Commission did
not issue a cease-and-desist order until six years later. We may be sure
that the Commission relied on post-acquisition factors in issuing its or-
der; there is no reason why we should rely on those factors less in as-
sessing the propriety of the Commission's action. Indeed, if anyone had
a 'free trial' period to check the anti-competitive potential of the merg-
er, it was not the respondent but the Commission."'
The nature of section 7 cases makes it imperative that the courts
delve rather deeply into the facts as presented. On the other hand,
"vague rules and the prospect of cumbersome proceedings threaten
to dissuade many a businessman from undertaking what might
actually be a lawful and even beneficial merger. In this way, the
effort to give thorough consideration to the particularities of each
case is carried out at the cost of preventing other acquisitions from
taking place at all."" A greater emphasis on post-acquisition evidence
"TAdelman, supra note 54; Bok, supra note 10; Turner, supra note 27.
The widened horizons of the imperfect market vastly complicate the problem
of predicting business behavior. . . . In this aura of complicated uncertainty,
theory cannot yet sustain reliable predictions concerning the impact on market
behavior of any but the most sweeping mergers.
Even if the consequences of any given merger could be isolated and identified,
rather difficult interpretative problems would remain in determining whether
'competition' is lessened or 'monopoly' increased.
Bok, supra note 10, at 243-44.
" See FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 605 (1965) (Stewart, J., con-
curring).
'9 329 F.2d at 627.
0 380 U.S. at 598.
8 1 Id. at 606 (Stewart, J., concurring).
6 Bok, supra note 10, at 272.
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